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1   Introduction  
All contracts begin with an offer and are concluded by the acceptance of said offer. Once 
the offer is accepted, an agreement is concluded.1 All commercial contracts contain both 
rights and obligations; an obligation to deliver something and the right to receive some-
thing. Often the consideration will be a monetary compensation. 
 
In larger contracts, the contracting party that is to receive money from the other party will 
often be in need of receiving payment not at the end of the contract, but several times dur-
ing the contracting period. This is the case in offshore contracts, in onshore construction 
contracts, in shipbuilding contracts and this is certainly the case in chartering agreements. 
Simply, most contracting parties does not have the financial strength to perform its obliga-
tions and spend money in order to perform its obligations without seeing payment in return 
continuously. Nor are they willing to bear the risks of the opposite party’s solvency at the 
end of the contract. 
 
In chartering agreements in general, the obligation to pay hire must often be paid on a 
monthly basis in advance.2 Payments in advance are preferred by the ship-owners and often 
used in chartering agreements as the ship-owner as the carrier will have to pay all costs 
related to the vessel itself, including crew salaries and expenses, e.g. insurance port salaries 
related to the crew etc., in the everyday services of the vessel chartered.3 Therefore, the 
                                                
 
1 In Norway this is regulated by the Norwegian Act on the Conclusion of Agreements 1st 
chapter (Avtaleloven, LOV-1918-05-31-4, 1ste kapitel). On English law, see H.G. Beale, 
“Chitty on Contracts, vol. 1”, §§ 2-001-2078. 
2 Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, “Scandinavian maritime law”, p. 434. See also inter alia 
NYPE 93 Clause 11 (a) stating that payment must be made 15 days in advance; Shelltime 4 
Clause 9 stipulating that payment must be made a month in advance. See also Coghlin, 
Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, The Norwegian Maritime Code also 
operates with a payment of hire 30 days in advance, see Section 391. 
3 See inter alia NYPE 93 Clause 6, Shelltime 4 Clause 6. See also Falkanger, “Konsekutive 
reiser”, p. 120, Michelet, “Håndbok i tidsbefraktning”, § 6, and Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, 
“Scandinavian maritime law”, p. 417. 
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advance hire payments function as security for the ship-owners as they could otherwise 
experience difficulties and problems of liquidity if payments were not due in advance and 
were left un-paid or paid late. Bearing in mind that most ship-owners hold titles to numer-
ous vessels, the importance of timely payment is even greater in order to limit the financial 
risks of the ship-owner. 
 
When timely payment of hire as such is certainly of the essence for the ship-owner, the 
chartering agreements must contain a remedy in case of non-payment or late payment. Of-
ten the ship-owner will be protected by a suspension and/or a cancellation clause.4 The 
charterer on the other hand must know what awaits him or her if he or she is in default 
when it comes to the payment of hire. The content and the extent of the suspension and 
cancellation clauses and to which extent the breach of contract the innocent party can claim 
damages, will be essential to the contracting parties. 
 
In 2013, an English Commercial Court judge found that payment of hire was a condition of 
a chartering agreement governed by English law.5 In the early spring 2015, a different Eng-
lish judge with the same Commercial Court, however, found the opposite.6 
 
Both decisions contain numerous considerations on several distinct legal issues, inter alia 
repudiatory breach, the validity of the charterparty guarantees and how to assess damages 
for repudiatory breach of chartering agreements. These issues will not be discussed in this 
thesis. However, the decisions have caused for a substantial amount of concern and unrest 
in the maritime industry. Is payment a condition under a charterparty? When and under 
which circumstances can contracting parties claim damages in case of cancellation of char-
terparties stemming from the default in hire payments? 
                                                
 
4 See sections 3, 4.2, and 4.5. 
5 Kuwait Rocks Co -v- AMB Bulkcarriers Inc (the Astra) [2013] EWHC 865 (Comm). Re-
ferred to as “the Astra” in the following. 
6 Spar Shipping AS v. Grand China Logistics Holding (Group) Co. Ltd [2015] EWHC 718 
(Comm). Referred to as “the Spar Shipping” in the following. 
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A vast number of law firms working within the maritime sector internationally has subse-
quent to both decisions published updates and shorter summaries, most of them advising 
that anyone involved in chartering agreements seek particular advice before entering into 
any charterparty. This thesis will introduce the two decisions by way of shorter analyses in 
order to discuss the English point of view and legal position and compare this to the legal 
position under Norwegian law.  
 
In order to do so, both the legal position in English law and the legal position in Norwegian 
law governed by the Norwegian Maritime Code will be introduced, and the right to cancel-
lation and suspension of performance in chartering agreements will be put into perspective.  
 
The importance of an investigation of the content of and the possible consequences of the 
two English cases for maritime law in Norway is imminent. As Professor Trond Solvang 
has put it; “when case law has proved the need for interpretation under English law, this is 
an indication of the need for similar questions of interpretation had the case been subject 
to Norwegian law.”7 
 
Secondly, the thesis will focus on one of the issues raised amongst lawyers subsequently to 
the recent development in English law: the need for what has been referred to as “commer-
cial certainty”. In this regard, the thesis will include the cancellation clauses giving the 
charterer the right to cancel the charterparty if the ship-owner fails to provide the vessel at 
his or her disposal at the agreed point in time.  
 
Further, the thesis will describe and compare four of the most commonly used standard 
chartering agreements in order to analyse whether the wording of these takes sufficient 
                                                
 
7 Solvang, Trond: ”Forsinkelse i havn”, p. 59 – my translation. Originally as follows: ”Når 
kontraktspraksis har avdekket behov for fortolkningsavklaring, er dette en klar indikasjon 
på hvilke tolkningsspørsmål som ville ha opstått om den same kontraktspraksis hadde vært 
underlagt norsk rett”. 
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consideration to the needs and challenges of the contracting parties knowing that the ship-
ping industry and the market for vessels on time charter parties will never be stationary.  
 
The thesis will lastly contain a discussion and offer a view on how to proceed from here as 
two English precedents are directly contradictory.  
2   Sources  of  law  –  the  structure  of  the  thesis  
Every contractual relationship starts with a contract. If the background law provides man-
datory rules on the subject matter, the contract is basically irrelevant. If not, the understand-
ing of said contract is determined by the content of the contract. If any of the contractual 
provisions needs interpretation, one must look to the background law. If the background 
law, including case law etc., however, does not provide advice, one must look elsewhere, 
e.g. legal theory, scholarly writings etc.8 
 
In the following, the examination of cancellation and suspension clauses will thus begin 
with four of the most common charterparties used in the industry to introduce the clauses as 
they are often drafted. Then, the legal positions on the clauses both in maritime law and in 
the background contract law in England and Norway will be investigated, followed by the 
examination of recent English case law. Lastly, a discussion as to the future development 
and a conclusion on whether or not the clauses provide sufficient commercial certainty to 
the contracting parties will be done. 
3   Cancellation  and  suspension  clauses  in  time  chartering  
agreements  
Contractual provisions containing a right to cancel the chartering agreement originate from 
the 1300’s around Visby in Sweden, where provisions giving the charterer a right to with-
draw and thereby cancel any voyage chartering agreement against monetary compensation 
to the ship-owner. Thus, the charterer could cancel the contract if he or she was willing to 
                                                
 
8 Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, “Scandinavian maritime law”, p. 34-43. 
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pay half the freight agreed between the parties.9 Similar types were later introduced in other 
European countries.10  
 
Traditionally, time chartering agreements contain a date and time for the point in time 
where the vessel must be at the disposal of the charterers.11 Sometimes this is done by set-
ting a fixed time and date, sometimes just a date, and sometimes the time charterparties 
only contain the point in time after which the charterers can cancel the agreement.12 This 
indication is sometimes referred to as the “cancellation date” but in the following the term 
“cancellation time” will be used. This is the term used in the Norwegian Maritime Code as 
“time” is more precise than “date”.13 
 
Ship-owners and charterers throughout the shipping industry are using standard time char-
tering agreements, adapted or added individually negotiated sections or choices, on a daily 
basis. Some of the most commonly used are the New York Produce Exchange, the Baltime, 
the Supplytime, and the Shelltime, which are introduced in the following.  
3.1   New  York  Produce  Exchange  Time  Charter  (NYPE93)  
The New York Produce Exchange form recommended by The Baltic and International 
Maritime Council (BIMCO) and The Federation of National Associations of Ship Brokers 
and Agents is one the world’s most renowned and used time charterparties, and was the 
centre of attention in both the Astra and the Spar Shipping cases.  
                                                
 
9 Bråfelt, Camilla, ”Fleksibilitet i certepartiforhold”, p. 125. 
10 Bråfelt, Camilla, ”Fleksibilitet i certepartiforhold”, p. 126. 
11 Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, “Scandinavian maritime law”, p. 424ff. 
12 See sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.2.1 and 4.5.1. 
13 Bredholt, Martens, Mathiasen, Philip, “Søloven med kommentarer”, p. 584. 
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3.1.1   The  ship-­owner’s  right  to  cancel  and  the  remedies  following  such  
cancellation  
Clause 11 regulates the hire payment. The clause stipulates that payment of hire must be 
paid 15 days in advance and, if not received by then, the ship-owners must issue a notice to 
the charterer informing he or she of the non-compliance with the contractual provision. The 
notice must contain a deadline for the charterer to make full payment of the outstanding 
amount. After the expiry of the so-called grace period,14 the ship-owners are entitled to 
withdraw the services of the vessel and thereby cancel15 the chartering agreement.16 The 
same is true if the non-payment is deemed a “fundamental breach” of the charterparty.17 
 
The charterparty does not contain provisions as to regulate the right to damages for the par-
ty not in breach, which is then subject to determination by using the background law of the 
country chosen by the contracting parties. The NYPE93 Clause 45 offers two opportunities; 
American law or English law. 
 
However, the charterparty does expressly state that the ship-owners shall be entitled to re-
ceive payment of hire and any extra expenses resulting from the withholding of the service 
of the vessel as a result of the missing payment. Accordingly, the ship-owner does not risk 
to have to do another voyage if the vessel has been loaded and bills of lading issued with-
out receiving proper compensation.18 
                                                
 
14 The clause ensuring a grace period is also called an ”anti-technicality note”, as was the 
case in the Astra case. In e.g. international sales law the concept is often explained using he 
German concept “Nachfrist”. See in this regard section 5.2.1.1. 
15 See BIMCO’s explanatory note to the NYPE93 Clause 11 as the term “withdraw” is 
equivalent to cancelling available at See also section 4.5.1 below. 
16 NYPE93 Clause 11 (lines 140-166). 
17 NYPE93 Clause 11 (line 149). 
18 See the BIMCO’s explanatory note to the NYPE 93 Clause 11 and Coghlin, Baker, Ken-
ny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, § 16.90-16.91. 
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3.1.2   The  charterer’s  right  to  cancel  
The charterers have the possibility to cancel the charterparty if the vessel is not at the dis-
posal of the charterers no later than at the point in time indicated in the contract.19 The form 
does therefore not contain a delivery time but only a cancellation time.20 Therefore, the 
charterers may at their convenience choose to cancel the chartering agreement, regardless 
of whether or not the delay was substantial or not. The mere fact that the vessel was not – 
or could not be – at the disposal of the charterers in the agreed condition, seaworthy and 
ready to load, is decisive.21 
 
The ship-owners may, however, require the charterers’ answer to whether or not they will 
accept a later delivery of the vessel. In such case, the ship-owners must provide a new time 
of delivery issued with reasonable certainty. Such request made by the ship-owners cannot 
be issued earlier than seven days before the new delivery time. If the charterers fail to reply 
within two days after having received this request from the ship-owners, the new point in 
time will be regarded the delivery time of the vessel. If the delivery of the vessel is once 
again late, the process can begin all over.22 
3.2   Baltime  1939  (as  revised  2001)  
The BIMCO Uniform Time-Charter was originally issued in 1909 and amended lastly in 
2001. The time chartering agreement is issued by The Baltic and International Maritime 
Council (BIMCO) and is subject to English law.23 
                                                
 
19 NYPE93 Clause 16 (lines 205-208). 
20 Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, § 7.5 and § 8.35. 
21 Bråfelt, Camilla, ”Fleksibilitet i certepartiforhold”, p. 198-200. 
22 NYPE 93 Clause 16 (lines 210-218). 
23 Baltime 1939 (2001) Clause 22(A) (lines 354-360). 
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3.2.1   The  ship-­owner’s  right  to  cancel  and  the  remedies  following  such  
cancellation  
The Baltime provides that hire must be paid in advance in the currency agreed upon by the 
contracting parties and, if not or paid late, the ship-owners shall have the right to withdraw 
the vessel of the service of the charterers without interference or protest.24 The charterparty 
contains no provisions as to the remedies of non-payment of hire, nor provisions on the 
right to interest on the outstanding hire payments. 
3.2.2   The  charterer’s  right  to  cancel  
The charterers have the right to cancel the chartering agreement if the vessel is not deliv-
ered at the time agreed upon by the parties. Therefore, the charterers may choose to cancel 
the chartering agreement or not, regardless of whether or not the delay was substantial or 
not. The mere fact that the vessel was not – or could not be – at the disposal of the charter-
ers in the agreed condition, seaworthy and ready to load, is decisive.25 
 
If, however, required by the ship-owners, the charterers must indicate within two days 
whether or not the charterers will accept delivery at another given point in time.26 
3.3   Supplytime  2005  
The Uniform Time Charter Party for Offshore Service Vessels known as the Supplytime is 
issued by BIMCO and adopted by, inter alia, the International Support Vessel Owners’ 
Association in London. The version subject to the following examination is from 2005 and 
is subject to English law.27 
                                                
 
24 Baltime 1939 (2001) Clause 6 (lines 80-92). 
25 Bråfelt, Camilla, ”Fleksibilitet i certepartiforhold”, p. 198-200. 
26 Baltime 1939 (2001) Clause 21 (lines 347-352). 
27 Supplytime 2005 Clause 34(a) (lines 1284-1294). 
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3.3.1   The  ship-­owner’s  right  to  cancel  and  the  remedies  following  such  
cancellation  
If payment of hire is not paid when due, the ship-owner is entitled to receive interests on 
the outstanding hire agreed upon by the contracting parties.28 
 
Supplytime 2005 also contains provisions stipulating that where the charterer has failed to 
provide timely payment of hire, the ship-owner must provide a written notice to the char-
terer giving he or she an additional period to make payment. The ship-owners are, however, 
entitled to suspend the performance of the vessel at once29 but even whilst suspended, the 
vessel remains on-hire.30  
 
If payment of hire is still not received by the ship-owners five days after the issuance of the 
written notice, the ship-owners may withdraw the vessel from the service of the charterers 
thereby cancelling the chartering agreement. This right of withdrawal remains whilst the 
hire payment is still not received but the receipt of hire payment before the issuing of a 
withdrawal notice is not a waiver of the ship-owner’s right to cancel the chartering agree-
ment.31 Thus, the ship-owner can withdraw the vessel from the service of the charterer even 
after having received hire payment with reference to the payment history. This is explicitly 
stated in Clause 12(f) para. (iii). 
 
The charterparty expressly limits the liability of the parties in terms of consequential dam-
ages.32 This provision, however, applies to performance claims under the charterparty and a 
mutual obligation for each party to defend the other if a claim for which the other party is 
liable is claimed from the non-liable party. The limitation to the liability does therefore not 
apply in the internal relationship between the parties to the charterparty. However, the char-
                                                
 
28 Supplytime 2005 Clause 12(e) (lines 473-477). 
29 Supplytime 2005 Clause 12(f) para. (i) (lines 491-502). 
30 Supplytime 2005 Clause 12(f) para. (i) (lines 497-502). 
31 Supplytime 2005 Clause 12(f) para. (ii) (lines 503-516). 
32 Supplytime 2005 Clause 14(c) (lines 671-682). 
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terparty does not contain provisions as to regulate the right to damages for the party not in 
breach, which is then subject to determination by English law. 
3.3.2   The  charterer’s  right  to  cancel  
If the vessel is not delivered at the point in time indicated in the chartering agreement, the 
charterer may cancel the contract. However, if the ship-owner is not able to deliver the ves-
sel at the agreed time and notice to the charterer in this regard is given, the charterer must 
provide the ship-owner with an answer as to whether or not he or she will accept delivery 
of the vessel at a later point in time. Such notice must be given within 24 hours of receipt 
of such notice. If the chartering agreement is cancelled by the charterer, none of the parties 
are liable to the other in terms of losses incurred by neither the non-delivery nor the cancel-
lation of contract.33 
3.4   Shelltime  4  
Shelltime 4 is a well-renowned time chartering agreement subject to English law. Shelltime 
4 is drafted by Shell International Trading and Shipping Company Ltd., but is used by other 
parties but the ones involved in transactions with Shell. 
3.4.1   The  ship-­owner’s  right  to  cancel  and  the  remedies  following  such  
cancellation  
The payment of hire under the charterparty is regulated by Clause 9 of the agreement. In 
case of the charterer’s failure to provide timely payment, the ship-owners must issue a writ-
ten notification to the charterer granting him or her an additional period of 7 days to make 
payment.34 After the expiry of this grace period, the ship-owner may withdraw the vessel 
from the service of the charterer and is entitled to interest on the unpaid amount.35 Thus, 
                                                
 
33 Supplytime 2005 Clause 2(c) (lines 48-65). 
34 Shelltime 4 Clause 9(a), Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, 
§ 37.64. 
35 Shelltime 4 Clause 9(b). 
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the charterer must pay the outstanding amount, including both the late hire payment owed 
and the interests accrued.36 
 
The charterparty does not contain provisions as to regulate the right to damages for the par-
ty not in breach, which is subject to determination by English law.  
3.4.2   The  charterer’s  right  to  cancel  
The charterers have the possibility to cancel the chartering agreement if the vessel is not at 
the disposal of the charterers no later at the point in time indicated in the contract.37 The 
charterparty contains no provisions on damages or remedies for the charterer if the vessel is 
not delivered timely. 
3.5   Comparison  of  the  four  time  chartering  agreements’  provisions  on  
delay  in  the  payment  of  hire  and  in  the  delivery  of  the  vessel  to  the  
charterer  
All of the four standard time chartering agreements introduced above give the ship-owner 
the right to withdraw the vessel from the services of the charterer and to cancel the char-
terparty if the charterer does not pay hire. In all but the Baltime this right is subject to the 
issuing of an extended time-limit for the charterer to make payment. The extent of the addi-
tional time periods the ship-owner must give the charterer to re-deem him- or herself and 
make full payment varies from 5 days in the Supplytime to 7 days in the Shelltime, whilst 
there is no default choice in the NYPE 93. Further, all of the four chartering agreements 
contain provisions on interests on outstanding amounts.  
 
Also, all of the four standard chartering agreements examined above also gives the charter-
er the right to cancel the contract if or when the ship-owner fails to deliver the vessel at the 
agreed point in time. It is however worth noting that e.g. the older version of the NYPE 93, 
                                                
 
36 Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, § 37.64. 
37 Shelltime 4 Clause 5, Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, § 
37.49. 
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the NYPE 46, does not grant the charterer such right. Therefore, there are still time char-
terparties which do not contain such provisions and, thus, the legal positions of the country 
chosen as the background law in the contracts are of decisive for the outcome.  
 
None of the charterparties contain provisions on the remedies if faced by a breach of con-
tract by the opposing contracting party. As such, the extent and legal understanding of any 
rights and obligations given under the contract are subject to the governing law. This is a 
choice made by the contracting parties. As showed, the default rule of all four of the con-
tracts are a choice of English38 – or in one instance American – contract law. Therefore, the 
background law including recent English case law on the matter will be decisive when es-
tablishing the legal position.  
 
The contracting parties are however free to choose e.g. Norwegian law to govern the con-
tract matter and then the Norwegian background law would be applicable.39 Therefore, 
although the contracts do provide provisions regulating the remedies both in terms of can-
cellation and suspension if a breach of contract occurs, the threshold for when a breach is 
substantial enough to make a cancellation of contract reasonable and justifiable is subject to 
the background contract law.  
 
The examination of English and Norwegian maritime law on cancellation and suspension 
clauses will be done in section 4, whilst recent English case law will be examined in detail 
below in section 5.  
4   The  legal  positions  in  Norway  and  in  England  
In the hierarchy of the sources of law in Norway, the Norwegian Maritime Code and other 
legislation and the interpretation of these are the primary sources of law. Then comes the 
                                                
 
38 Or American law in the NYPE 93, see Clause 45. 
39 See the Norwegian Civil Procedure Act § 4-6 and Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, “Scandina-
vian maritime law”, p. 36. 
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contract itself and the interpretation of the contractual provisions. Case law, legal theory, 
scholarly writings etc. can however play a part in both the aforementioned when determin-
ing the legal position and outcome in a specific situation.40 
 
In England, the legal outcome will depend on the contractual provisions the parties have 
agreed upon. How is the contract drafted and how must the provisions naturally be under-
stood? This is in England known as the principle of the “four corners of the contract”.41 
4.1   Norwegian  contract  law  
Often books, theory and scholarly writings on contracts or related to contracts are often 
commenced with an opening remark on offer and acceptance or with a Latin quote on the 
binding nature of concluded contracts. However, the right to terminate a contract when the 
opposite contracting party is severely breaching its obligations under the contract is an 
equally important cornerstone of any contract. It is a prerequisite for anyone entering into 
an agreement. Any other right to terminate the contract may as well be included in the con-
tract itself; an expiry date or a re-negotiation clause or automatic cancellation if or when 
specific circumstances occur.42 
 
If met by a substantial breach of contract under circumstances , the innocent party can 
choose between three options; (i) specific performance (in Norwegian: “natura-
lopfyllelse”), (ii) cancellation and (iii) damages.43 A claim for specific performance can be 
combined with a claim for damages in that regard, and likewise in case of cancellation of 
the contract.44 
 
                                                
 
40 Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, “Scandinavian maritime law”, p. 26-39. 
41 Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, “Scandinavian maritime law”, p. 31. 
42 On cancellation of contracts, see Kai Krüger ”Norsk Kontraktsrett” § 43, Viggo Hag-
strøm, ”Obligasjonsrett”, chapter 18, Bråfelt, Camilla, ”Fleksibilitet i certepartiforhold”, p. 
117-121. 
43 The principles in the Norwegian Sale of Goods Act (lov 1988-05-13-27) § 22(1) applies.  
44 The Norwegian Sale of Goods Act (lov 1988-05-13-27) § 22(1), 2nd para. 
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Normally, specific performance of the obligations under the contract even though specific 
performance is the starting point when it comes to remedies under Norwegian law45 but 
traditionally, the remedy in case of breach of contract within the transport sector in Norway 
has been damages.  
 
The background for this deviation from the Norwegian “normal” seems to be the influence 
from common-law countries such as the English and American systems, where damages 
are used when they are deemed to be adequate to protect the expectation interest of the par-
ty not in breach.46 Which may be all types of disputes where the expectation interest is of a 
generic sort and not a specific.47  
 
In shipping and transportation of cargo by ship the needs are hard to describe in general. 
Sometimes the cargo owner will need a vessel of a very generic type for the transportation 
of generic cargo (or at least cargo in generic packages, inter alia containers). At other 
times, the need will be more specific calling for the usage of a specific vessel able to carry 
or load a specific cargo. In the latter examples the need for specific performance will thus 
be of greater importance and the remedy of damages less suitable in the event of breach of 
contract.  
 
In the evaluation as to whether or not a contract has been substantially48 breached and, 
therefore, may be terminated by the party not in breach, one is to determine whether the 
cancellation would be a reasonable and proportionate remedy for the breach of contractual 
                                                
 
45 Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, “Scandinavian maritime law”, p. 44, Kai Krüger ”Norsk Kon-
traktsrett”, p. 749, Viggo Hagstrøm, ”Obligasjonsrett”, chapter 15.2, Bråfelt, Camilla, 
”Fleksibilitet i certepartiforhold”, p. 122. 
46 Bråfelt, Camilla, ”Fleksibilitet i certepartiforhold”, p. 123. 
47 See in this regard the works of Trond Solvang discussing the possibility to offer a differ-
ent but identical ship under a shipbuilding contract in order to perform contractual in 
“Right of substitution under building contracts” reviewing the arbitration award ND 
2001.526. 
48 Substantially is my choice of term. Equally suitable would be both the terms ”materially” 
and ”repudiatory”.  
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obligation conducted by the other contracting party.49 In this evaluation the nature, the 
length, and the circumstances surrounding the breach of contract must be taken into ac-
count. I will revert to the substantiality of a breach of contract on a more specific note be-
low section 4.2.1.3.  
4.2   The  Norwegian  Maritime  Code  
The Norwegian Maritime Code contains three provisions regulating the cases where either 
(i) the charterer has not provided the hire in a timely manner or (ii) the ship-owner is in 
delay supplying the charterer with the vessel. In both examples a breach of contract thus 
exists. 
 
The provisions are comparable to the provisions contained in the standard time chartering 
agreements used amongst the contracting parties of the industry, which were introduced in 
section 3. The three provisions will be introduced in the following. 
4.2.1   The  right  of  suspension  and  cancellation  in  Section  391  following  the  delay  
in  payment  if  hire  under  time  chartering  agreements  
4.2.1.1   Payment  of  hire  
Time chartering agreements governed by Norwegian law will often contain a provision 
stating that the hire shall be paid in advance, either every two weeks (15 days) as is the case 
with e.g. the NYPE 9350 time chartering agreement or monthly.51 In the Norwegian Mari-
time Code Section 390 the declaratory rule is that hire must be paid 30 days in advance.52 
 
This is a deviation from the the general principle in Norwegian contract law that the con-
tracting parties are to perform each of its contractual obligations at the same time – in 
                                                
 
49 Viggo Hagström ”Obligasjonsrett”, chapter 15.3.2, Kai Krüger ”Norsk Kontraktsrett”, p. 
673-674. 
50 NYPE93 Clause 11, lines 141-152. 
51 Michelet, “Håndbok i tidsbefraktning”, p. 250-251. 
52 See the Norwegian Maritime Code Section 390(1). 
 16 
Norwegian the principle of “ytelse mot ytelse”. This is however not possible in time char-
terparties due to the natural circumstances of the contractual relationship.53 One of the con-
tracting parties must thus perform its contractual obligation in advance, either the ship-
owner or the charterer.54 The parties are however free to agree on different payment 
schemes.55 
 
If the charterer does not comply with the demand for payment, the charterer will be in 
breach of contract by default of payment. The ship-owner then has the three possibilities 
introduced above; (i) specific performance, (ii) cancellation and (iii) damages.56 A demand 
for specific performance can be combined with a claim for damages in that regard, and 
likewise in case of cancellation of the contract.57 
 
The possibility to claim specific performance is natural as the hire is an obligation under 
the time chartering agreement, and the party not in breach under any agreement under 
Norwegian law can claim specific performance by its counterpart. The second possibility is 
governed either by the contractual provisions or by law. As a general rule, contracts gov-
erned by Norwegian law can only be cancelled when the breach of contract is regarded to 
be substantial. However, the barrier for when a breach is considered substantial is either 
governed by the contract itself and thus stems from the meeting of minds of the contracting 
parties at the time of conclusion of the chartering agreement, or governed by the back-
ground law.58 
                                                
 
53 Or in any contracts of hire, such as the hire of buildings etc. 
54 Falkanger, “Leie av skib”, p. 429. 
55 The Norwegian Maritime Code Section 322. 
56 See section 4.1 The principles in the Norwegian Sale of Goods Act (lov 1988-05-13-27) 
§ 22(1) applies. See Bredholt, Martens, Mathiasen, Philip, “Søloven med kommentarer”, p. 
603. 
57 See section 4.1. 
58 See section 4.2.1.3. 
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4.2.1.2   The  cancellation  and  suspension  rights  when  payment  of  hire  is  delayed  –  
Section  391  
The the Norwegian Maritime Code Section 391(1) gives the ship-owner the right to receive 
interest on any outstanding amount originating from default in hire payments. Further, Sec-
tion 391(2) stipulates that the ship-owner59 must issue a notice to the charterer informing 
him or her of the default in payment. After having issued this notice, the ship-owner is enti-
tled to withdraw the vessel from the services of the charterer.60 Pursuant to Section 392(1), 
the vessel will remain on-hire throughout the suspension.61 If the charterer has not paid the 
hire due within 72 hours after the notification was given, the ship-owner is entitled to can-
cel the time chartering agreement.62 Unless of course the parties have agreed otherwise.63 
The right in section 391 for the ship-owner to suspend the performance is however exclu-
sively in case of non-payment of the hire.64 
 
When the ship-owner has suspended performance under the chartering agreement or the 
chartering agreement has been cancelled, the ship-owner is entitled to damages, unless the 
charterer can show that the late payment was caused by a hindrance out of its control and 
this hindrance could not reasonably have been foreseen, avoided or overcome by the time 
charterer at the time of the conclusion of the chartering agreement.65 
 
                                                
 
59 The Norwegian Maritime Code uses the term ”time carrier” in order to cover cases where 
the carrier may not be the ship-owner but, e.g. have chartered the vessel from the ship-
owner on either a bareboat charterparty or a time charterparty and is sub-chartering out the 
vessel. 
60 Wording of Section 391(2). 
61 Bredholt, Martens, Mathiasen, Philip, “Søloven med kommentarer”, p. 604. 
62 Wording of Section 391(2). 
63 Michelet, “Håndbok i tidsbefraktning”, p. 261. 
64 Michelet, “Håndbok i tidsbefraktning”, p. 259, Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, “Scandinavian 
maritime law”, p. 438-439. 
65 Wording of Section 391(3), Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, “Scandinavian maritime law”, p. 
438-439. 
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Leading Norwegian theory is stating that the default of hire payments under time char-
terparties traditionally has been considered a “serious breach of contract” making the char-
terer liable to suffer the consequences of suspension and cancellation of the chartering 
agreement even from a minor deviation from the provisions in the agreement.66  
 
The delay of payment itself is thus sufficient for the charterer to be liable for damages pur-
suant to Section 391(3) as the liability is “strict”.67 This means that the charterer as a start-
ing point is liable even without fault and, thus, that damages must be paid regardless of the 
reason for the delay, exempt for instances of unforeseeable breakdown of the payment sys-
tems etc. completely out of the charterer’s control sphere. There are contradicting view in 
Norwegian legal theory stating that it is somewhat doubtful that a Norwegian court will 
find that a contractual provision giving the right to terminate in case of a minor breach of 
contract should be enforceable.68 The wording of any contract or clause in a contract could 
as such be subject to testing in the court system.  
 
Contracts under Norwegian law are, however, as the clear starting point valid when entered 
into by two legally capable entities, and the contract was concluded voluntarily and not 
caused by fraud etc.69 When two professional parties are acting within their field of exper-
tise it is unlikely to have set a side contractual provisions, safe for examples of fraud or 
other unlawful actions.70 
                                                
 
66 Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, “Scandinavian maritime law”, p. 436 and Michelet, “Hånd-
bok i tidsbefraktning”, p. 261ff. 
67 Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, “Scandinavian maritime law”, p. 439 and p. 458. 
68 Bråfelt, Camilla, ”Fleksibilitet i certepartiforhold”, p. 189-191. 
69 The Norwegian Act on the Conclusion of Contracts 3rd chapter (Avtaleloven, LOV-1918-
05-31-4, 3dje kapitel). 
70 The Norwegian Supreme Court has previously decided that the section applies also be-
tween professional parties in the decision in Rt. 1985.234 and this has later been reiterated 
– although the opinion is expressed by the minority of the judges deciding the case, but the 
point was however not contradicted. It is thus acknowledged that Section 36 of the Norwe-
gian Act on the Conclusion of Contracts applies also to contractual relationships between 
professional parties, see also Rt. 1999.922. The threshold for the courts to set aside contrac-
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Legal theory suggests however that in theory a contractual provision stating that even the 
slightest delay in payment should be regarded a substantial breach, could be set a side even 
if the contract stipulated so.71 This principle is also envisaged by the Norwegian Maritime 
Code Section 391(3) stating that the time charterparty can only be terminated as a conse-
quence of missing payment if the delay in payment is not caused by hindrances unforesee-
able to the charterer.72 However, payment of hire is regarded a substantial part of the con-
tract and will be upheld strictly:  
 
“As for the payment of hire is concerned, the contract would most likely be upheld: 
That the hire must be paid timely is of great significance, and only rarely would 
there be doubt as to the point in time to pay (the hire)” 73 
 
 
In this regard it must be noted that Norwegian courts traditionally have been very reluctant 
to adjust a clear wording in a commercial contract, whether it be on the basis of interpreta-
tion or the unreasonableness standard in the Norwegian Act on the Conclusion of Contracts 
Section 36.74 
 
The Danish commentary to the Danish Maritime Code75 suggests the same stating that “a 
rule resulting in the right terminate the contract on the grounds of any delay would be un-
                                                                                                                                               
 
tual provisions is however substantial when both parties are professional acting within their 
field of expertise or business. See in this regard Rt. 2000.806. Later, the Supreme Court has 
also stated that the use of Section 36 between professional parties demand ”special circum-
stances”, see Rt. 2008.969, para. 39. 
71 Falkanger, “Leie av skib” p. 458. 
72 See section 4.2.1 for a specific presentation of the provision. 
73 Falkanger, “Leie av skib”, p. 458. My translation, originally “Forsåvidt angår leiebe-
talingen, vil ordningen formodentlig bli opprettholdt: At hovedvederlaget skal betales 
punktlig, er av vesentlig betydning, og det vil sjelden være tvil om når og hvorledes dette 
skal gjøres”. 
74 See footnote 70. 
75 Bredholt, Martens, Mathiasen, Philip, “Søloven med kommentarer” is the Danish Com-
mentary to the Danish Maritime Code. The publication is relevant also in the understanding 
of the Norwegian Maritime Code as the acts are identical, cf. Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, 
 20 
reasonable”76 and thus possibly be set aside by the courts. The reasonability test thus pro-
vides that if the charterer does not rectify the missing payment by paying the hire within an 
additional time limit fixed by the ship-owner. The declaratory rule in Norwegian Maritime 
Code is 72 hours, see Section 391(3).77 
 
In conclusion, this means that the ship-owner under Norwegian law rightfully can terminate 
a contract without fear of being in breach of contract himself if the charterer has been pro-
vided an extended period of at least 72 hours to pay the hire and the charterer has not met 
this deadline and provided full payment. This is also the case for voyage charterparties.78 
This also means that the ship-owner cannot rightfully terminate the contract prior to the 
expiry of the 72 hours grace period79, unless the ship-owner terminates the contract with 
reference to anticipatory breach, which may incur prior to the expiry of the 72 hour limit.80 
In both cases however provided that the delay in payment is not caused by someone or 
something out of the charterer’s control and unforeseeable for the charterer.81 
 
4.2.1.3   Lowering  the  threshold  for  the  substantiality  of  a  breach  of  contract  by  agreement  
The provision in the Norwegian Maritime Code Section 391 is not mandatory. As such, it 
can be deviated from by agreement by the parties.82 
                                                                                                                                               
 
“Scandinavian maritime law”, p. 31. In the making of the Danish Commentary the use of 
Norwegian legal theory is widespread. 
76 My translation, originally in Danish: “en regel om, at enhver forsinkelse giver ret til at 
hæve, vil være urimelig”. 
77 The additional time period for the party in default to rectify his or her breach of contract 
is known from the Norwegian Sale of Goods Act (lov 1988-05-13-27) § 25. The German 
term for the same “Nachfrist” is widely acknowledged and used in international sales law. 
See the Bredholt, Martens, Mathiasen, Philip, “Søloven med kommentarer”, p. 555 and p. 
603 and Michelet, “Håndbok i tidsbefraktning”, § 8.42.83. 
78 Bredholt, Martens, Mathiasen, Philip, “Søloven med kommentarer”, p. 575. 
79 Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, “Scandinavian maritime law”, p. 438 
80 Bredholt, Martens, Mathiasen, Philip, “Søloven med kommentarer”, p. 603. 
81 The Norwegian Maritime Code Section 391(3). 
82 The Norwegian Maritime Code Section 322. 
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As such, the parties to agreement can lower the threshold for when the parties will have 
either a right to suspend performances under the contract, or when a breach of contract 
shall be deemed substantial enough for the innocent party to cancel the agreement. The 
right to cancel according to the cancellation clause is as such just an agreed option to can-
cel if certain conditions are met.83  
 
Herman Steen has argued that such an agreement must be explicit and by no means can go 
any further than what the parties have put on paper in the contract. The exact wording of 
the contract is thereby decisive. Falkanger seems to go a bit further from the somewhat 
English approach argued by Steen, as Falkanger proposes that the legal content of such 
agreement must be sought to be found be way of interpretation of the intentions of the par-
ties, not focusing on the mere wording of the contract’s provisions.84 
 
Falkanger further argues that even if the parties were not agreeing, one of contractual par-
ties’ intentions could be decisive and that an example where for example the ship-owner’s 
special needs were unknown to the charterer at the time of the conclusion of the contract.85 
Decisive should however be, which contracting party is the closest to bear the risk.86 The 
same argumentation is relevant as far as the suspension clauses are concerned. 
 
There seems to be advantages and disadvantages in both the argumentations. Naturally, the 
wording of the contractual provision must have a significant part to play when deciding 
whether or not the parties have agreed to lower the threshold for a breach to be substantial. 
However, the parties’ intention must be involved in the evaluation as well. In order to de-
termine the parties’ intention naturally one would look at all the data available, from nego-
tiations etc. to the minutes from the concluding meeting. Thereby, the strictly English ap-
                                                
 
83 Steen, Herman, ”Cancellation clauses in voyage charter parties”, p. 147. 
84 Falkanger, “Konsekutive reiser”, p. 154-155, Falkanger, ”Leie av skip”, p. 458. 
85 Falkanger, “Konsekutive reiser”, p. 154-155, Falkanger, ”Leie av skip”, p. 458. 
86 Falkanger, “Konsekutive reiser”, p. 157. 
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proach is rejected to its full extent.87 On the other hand, even if the parties had discussed 
the possibility and assumedly also been very near to reaching an agreement as well during 
the negotiations but not included this in the wording of the contract, this counts in favour of 
the explicit wording of the contractual provisions in the concluded agreement as the possi-
ble outcomes would thus be incalculable and somewhat arbitrary.  
 
The most reasonable outcome would thus be a compromise; a compromise Falkanger 
seems to be aiming at when suggesting that decisive should be which party is the nearest to 
bear the risk of the breach in question. If the charterer does not pay the hire timely, the 
charterer should be able to both suspend performance and terminate the contract thereby 
claiming damages for the losses in this regard, regardless of any explicit wording in the 
contract. The charterer is per se the nearest to bear the risk and the consequences of his or 
her lack of ability to pay the hire timely. The same argument goes for the suspension and 
cancellation clauses giving the charterer the right to suspend performance and cancel the 
chartering agreement in case the ship-owner cannot provide the vessel at the time it was 
promised. As such, the parties can lower the threshold for the substantiality of a breach of 
contract and the interpretation of such agreement should be in favour of the innocent party. 
 
4.2.1.4   Damages  
The ship-owner can claim damages from the point in time where the cancellation of the 
time charterpartywas effected.88 As a starting point, the charterer’s liability is strict, mean-
ing that the charterer is liable even when no culpable act has been conducted.89 This start-
ing point is evidently subject to the provisions in the Norwegian Maritime Code, e.g. Sec-
tion 391(3), which exempts the charterer from liability if the late payment is caused by un-
foreseeable miscommunications etc., discussed above. 
                                                
 
87 The English principle of the four corners of the contract, see section 4. 
88 Falkanger, “Leie av skib”, p. 459. 
89 Falkanger, “Konsekutive reiser”, p. 223, Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, “Scandinavian mari-
time law”, p. 439 and p. 458. See section 4.2.1.2. 
 23 
 
The charterer is potentially liable for all adequate losses suffered as a consequence of the 
late or missing payment.90 This included the loss of bargain in the case of cancellation of 
the chartering agreement. The damages redeemable for the ship-owner also includes losses 
suffered from changes in the market and subsequent losses directly linked to the cancella-
tion of the chartering agreement, e.g. lawyers’ fees, brokers’ fees etc. 
 
However, it must be noted that case law has shown that the time for providing hire pay-
ments must be clearly stipulated.91 In order for the breach of contract to be substantial, the 
deadline for making hire payments must thus be stipulated explicitly and clearly in the 
chartering agreement. 
 
4.2.2   The  right  of  cancellation  in  Section  375  in  time  chartering  agreements  when  
the  vessel  is  delayed    
The charterer is entitled to cancel the chartering agreement if and when the vessel is not 
ready to load at the time agreed upon in the chartering agreement, or if notice of readiness 
has not been given before said time.92 
 
The charterer is entitled to damages for losses resulting from late delivery under Section 
375 of the Norwegian Maritime Code pursuant to Section 377, if the chartering agreement 
is cancelled.93 
 
                                                
 
90 Falkanger, “Konsekutive reiser”, p. 223 and Bredholt, Martens, Mathiasen, Philip, 
“Søloven med kommentarer”, p. 603. 
91 This was e.g. not the case in ND 1970.432 DA (The Sunny Lady) where the carrier’s 
change of plans for repairs of the vessel had resulted in a change of the payment plans as 
well. As a result, the ship-owner could not rightfully withdraw the vessel. See Michelet, 
“Håndbok i tidsbefraktning”, p. 263. 
92 The Norwegian Maritime Code Section 375(1). 
93 Michelet, “Håndbok i tidsbefraktning”, § 7.26. 
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In order to balance the risks between the ship-owner and the charterer, and to avoid unnec-
essary economic loss, Section 375(2) provides for the ship-owner to provide the charterer a 
revised date of readiness.94 The charterer must thus notify the ship-owner whether or not he 
or she wishes to cancel the contract. If the chartering agreement is not cancelled or no mes-
sage from the charterer is provided the ship-owner, the revised date will be regarded the 
new cancellation time under the chartering agreement.95 
 
Further, Section 375(3) of the Norwegian Maritime Code gives the charterer the right to 
cancel the chartering agreement in any other case of substantial breach of contract caused 
by late delivery.96 The provision is a codification of general principles under contract law. 
 
Legal theory has suggested, however, that Section 376 effects the evaluation as to whether 
the charterer can cancel the charterparty pursuant to Section 375.97 This should thus cause 
that the charterer could only terminate the charterparty if the delay was substantial. How-
ever, the wording of the provision stipulates that Section 376 regulates whether or not the 
vessel is defect. The point in time for this evaluation is “on delivery”.  
 
Section 376 stipulates that the charterer may only cancel the contract if the vessel is in a 
substantial lesser condition that agreed upon. If the vessel is not suffering from a substan-
tial defect, the charterer may only be compensated economically for the lesser value of the 
ship through a proportionate discount in hire. However, Section 375 regulates the cancella-
tion right prior to delivery of the vessel.  
 
In a recent case, the court found that the cancellation time was absolute and as the ship-
owner was late, the charterer was entitled to damages including the difference in hire on the 
substitute time charterpartyentered into with a third party and the cancelled chartering 
                                                
 
94 The Norwegian Maritime Code Section 375(2). 
95 Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, “Scandinavian maritime law”, p. 426. 
96 The Norwegian Maritime Code Section 375(3). 
97 Bråfelt, Camilla, ”Fleksibilitet i certepartiforhold”, p. 194-195. 
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agreement between the ship-owner and the charterer.98 Elderly precedents however have 
stated the opposite and the factual circumstances of each case must thus be carefully con-
sidered.99 If the vessel arrives delayed, the principle in Section 376 might however influ-
ence the charterer’s access to cancel the charterparty. 
 
4.3   Sub-­conclusion  
Declaratory Norwegian provisions grants the ship-owner the right to withdraw the vessel in 
case of the charterer’s late payment of hire and to terminate the chartering agreement alto-
gether if the charterer after the issuance of a notification and the expiry of a grace period if 
hire has still not been paid. Vice versa, the charterer is granted a right to cancel the contract 
if the vessel is not at the disposal of the charterer at the agreed point in time.  
 
The rights granted by the provisions are comparable to the ones in the standard chartering 
agreements examined above in section 3 but distinct when it comes to the grace period giv-
en the charterer in order for it to redeem the default in the payment of hire, and the conse-
quences in terms of damages granted the innocent party in either case of breach of contract. 
 
Lastly, the right of suspension is not explicitly granted under the standard chartering 
agreements. 
 
                                                
 
98 ND 2002.242 and Bredholt, Martens, Mathiasen, Philip, “Søloven med kommentarer” p. 
584. 
99 Bredholt, Martens, Mathiasen, Philip, “Søloven med kommentarer” p. 584 with reference 
to ND 1953.299, ND 1951.176 and ND.1949.312. 
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4.4   English  contract  law  
4.4.1   Contracts  under  English  law  in  general  
Contracts under English law have traditionally been divided into (i) conditions and (ii) war-
ranties and (iii) intermediate terms.100 A breach of an intermediate contractual term only 
entitles the party not in breach to terminate the contract where the breach is sufficiently 
serious, whereas a breach of condition entitles the innocent party to terminate a contract 
regardless of the severity of the breach. Therefore, the distinction is highly relevant to the 
contracting parties. 
4.4.1.1   Conditions    
Conditions are the essential provisions of a contract.101 This includes all provisions and 
stipulations in the agreement where the exact performance of an obligation of the contract 
is so vital for the other contracting party that it should be regarded a condition to the 
agreement to perform his or her part of the agreement. In other words, said provision is 
regarded to contain the substance of the contract to one party and the lack of due perfor-
mance to the contractual word by the second contracting party would be considered a fail-
ure to perform under the contract at all.102 The performance of an obligation that is a condi-
tion of a contract must therefore take place in the exact time and condition as stated in the 
agreement or – absent any specific provision on the performance – in accordance with the 
parties’ intention at the time of conclusion of the contract. 
 
The breach of a condition constitutes in itself repudiation of the contract. As such, the prin-
cipal function of a condition is to ensure certainty that the breach of such condition gives 
the innocent party the right to terminate the contract, and entitles the innocent party to 
                                                
 
100 H.G. Beale, “Chitty on Contracts, vol. 1”, §§ 12-019 - 12-024 and Peel, “Treitel on the 
Law of Contract”, § 18-048. 
101 H.G. Beale, “Chitty on Contracts, vol. 1”, § 12-026. 
102 H.G. Beale, “Chitty on Contracts, vol. 1”, § 12-026 with reference to Wallis, Son & 
Wells v Pratt & Haynes (1910) 2 K.B. 1003, 1012. 
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damages for the losses arising out said cancellation.103 Damages under English law are 
however only recoverable up to the point where the contract is terminated, as there is no 
breach of contract after the cancellation.104 
4.4.1.2   Warranties  
The warranties are the provisions of a contract that are less important than the conditions of 
the contract, or the terms that are collateral for the conditions of the contract.105 Are the 
warranties breached, the party not in breach cannot see him- or herself as relieved of its 
obligations under the contract as a breach of warranty does not cause for treating the con-
tract as repudiated.106 However, the circumstances of the breach of a warranty entitles the 
party not in breach of a claim for damages caused by the breach of contract.107 
4.4.1.3   Intermediate  terms  
The intermediate terms are the terms of contract that are neither a condition nor a warranty. 
If an intermediate term of contract is breached, the party not in breach may be relieved 
from his or her obligations under the contract by cancellation of the contract, but only if the 
party not in breach is substantially deprived of the whole benefit of the contract. In other 
words, the nature of the breach is decisive as to whether or not the party not in breach may 
terminate the contract.108 
 
If the innocent party is not substantially deprived of the whole benefit of the contract, the 
remedy is damages for the losses suffered by said breach of contract only. On the other 
hand, is a condition of contract breached, the innocent party may choose to treat itself as 
discharged from further performance of its obligations under the contract.109 
                                                
 
103 Peel, “Treitel on the Law of Contract”, § 18-069. 
104 Financings Ltd. v. Baldock [1963] 2 QB 104. 
105 H.G. Beale, “Chitty on Contracts, vol. 1”, § 12-031. 
106 H.G. Beale, “Chitty on Contracts, vol. 1”, §§ 12-031 and 12-032. 
107 H.G. Beale, “Chitty on Contracts, vol. 1”, § 12-031. 
108 H.G. Beale, “Chitty on Contracts, vol. 1”, § 12-020. 
109 H.G. Beale, “Chitty on Contracts, vol. 1”, §§ 12-019 and 12-034. 
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Termination of a contract may entitle the party not in breach to damages from the breach-
ing party for future losses110 but only if the breach is either repudiatory or by renunciation. 
4.4.2   When  is  a  provision  in  a  contract  a  condition?  
A contractual provision is a condition when (i) it is either expressly stated so by statute, (ii) 
if a judicial precedent has categorised the given provision to be of such nature, (iii) if the 
provision is designed to be a condition in the contract or if the party not in breach under the 
contract is to be considered discharged from its obligations under the contract if the oppo-
site party is in breach of said provision, or, (iv) if the nature of the subject-matter or the 
circumstances makes it likely that the contracting parties had intended that in case the giv-
en provision was breached, the party not in breach was to consider himself discharged from 
his obligations under the contract.111 Lastly, if a provision containing an obligation to per-
form in a certain given timeframe, e.g. a date or interval, and that stipulation is regarded to 
be of the essence of the contract, the contractual provision will be deemed to be a condition 
of the contract.112 If the term “of the essence” is used directly in the contract, the given 
provision containing that phrase will often be deemed to be a condition.113 
 
4.4.3   Does  the  importance  of  commercial  certainty  influence  whether  a  
contractual  provision  is  a  condition?    
Commercial certainty is regarded as being important under English law and therefore it has 
significant relevance whether a contractual provision is regarded a condition, a warranty or 
an intermediate term as the outcome of a breach of a provision under the contract is highly 
dependant under which category the provision falls.114 
 
                                                
 
110 McMeel, Gerard, “The Construction of Contracts” §§ 20.10 and 23.31. 
111 H.G. Beale, “Chitty on Contracts, vol. 1”, § 12-040. 
112 H.G. Beale, “Chitty on Contracts, vol. 1”, § 12-037. 
113 McMeel, Gerard, “The Construction of Contracts” § 20-19 and H.G. Beale, “Chitty on 
Contracts, vol. 1”, § 12-037. 
114 H.G. Beale, “Chitty on Contracts, vol. 1”, § 12-037. 
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In leading English legal theory, it is however stated that there are a multitude of examples 
of provisions in mercantile contracts of different origin and form, where the outcome could 
be either one. As such, examples are mentioned of delivery of the vessel, time of notice of 
readiness, the time of payment of hire. etc., which were all considered to be conditions un-
der the contract as the commercial certainty was a factor.115 However, it also stated directly 
that “there is no presumption of fact or rule of law that time is of the essence in mercantile 
contracts and a stipulation as to time in such a contract, may on its true construction, be 
found to be merely an intermediate term.”116 Decisive will thus be the wording of the con-
tract itself and the factual circumstances in a given case. 
4.5   English  maritime  law  
The legal system in England is a common-law system, where the courts and judges play a 
significant role in deciding the legal position through decisions and usage of citations of 
previous cases as legal precedents in cases before them. There is as such no English stat-
utes governing charterparties.117  
 
The following presentation of the position under English law thus presupposes that a valid 
agreement subject to English law has been concluded, and the position introduced is as 
such English contract law rather than maritime law, but nonetheless specific for contracts 
related to the maritime field. The English position is introduced in section 4.4 and elaborat-
ed on under the introductions of the Astra and the Spar Shipping cases in sections 5.2.1 and 
5.2.2. 
                                                
 
115 H.G. Beale, “Chitty on Contracts, vol. 1”, § 12-037. 
116 H.G. Beale, “Chitty on Contracts, vol. 1”, § 12-037, in fine. 
117 Michelet, “Håndbok i tidsbefraktning”, p. 263. 
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4.5.1   The  right  of  suspension  and  cancellation  in  case  of  late  or  insufficient  hire  
payments  
The right to suspend performance of the contractual obligations in case of the other party’s 
breach of contract known in Norwegian and Scandinavian law118 is not recognised under 
English law. Under English law, the party not in breach has the right to terminate the con-
tract, in this case the chartering agreement, not to withhold or suspend performances of 
such obligations.119 Therefore, if the charterers fail to make punctual and full120 payment of 
any instalment of the hire, the ship-owner is – subject to the contractual provisions provid-
ing for e.g. the issuance and the expiry of any grace period121 – entitled under English law 
to withdraw the vessel from the services of the charterer thereby cancelling the charterpar-
ty.122 The withdrawal is final; no temporary suspension is possible.123 
 
The right for the ship-owners to terminate the contract in case of default by late or insuffi-
cient hire payments continue to exist even after the charterers may have made full payment 
and, therefore, no longer are in current default, unless the ship-owners has waived the right 
to withdraw the vessel either impliedly or explicitly.124 The threshold for waiving of any 
such right is however by some characterised as low and particularly in the event of having 
received payment late, the ship-owner should act instantly and re-pay the payment received 
                                                
 
118 See in this regard section 4.2.  
119 Solvang, Trond: ”Forsinkelse i havn”, p. 104 and Østergaard, ”Søretten i formueretligt 
perspektiv”, p. 224 and Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, § 
16.74. 
120 Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, § 16.74. 
121 The anti-technicality note grants the charterer a period of grace in order to ensure that 
the vessel is not withdrawn on the basis of mere technicalities, see Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, 
Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, §§ 16.74 and 16.90-16.91. 
122 Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, § 16.74-16.75 
123 Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, § 16.84-16.85 and § 
16.111-16.119 
124 Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, §§ 16.74-83. 
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in order not to be deemed to having waived its right of cancellation due to laches.125 None-
theless, the ship-owner is not estopped from exercising the right to withdraw the vessel 
neither if payments of hire historically have been received late126 nor by the fact that the 
delayed payment has been received by ship-owner.127 
 
The ship-owners maintain the right to receive hire and other amounts owed under the char-
tering agreement up to the point in time where the agreement is terminated.128 The right to 
claim damages as a consequence of the cancellation of the contract is dependant of the fac-
tual circumstances and the provisions in the given contract. The decisive factor is, as ex-
plained in section 5.3, is whether the party in breach was in repudiatory breach or not.129  
 
Contrary to Norwegian and Scandinavian law, there is no test as for reasonability in Eng-
lish law. In English law it is not questioned whether a strict application of the cancelling 
option might lead to unreasonable results. Under English law, the contract itself and the 
wording of the contractual is decisive.130 Therefore, in English law foreseeability out-
weighs considerations as to reasonability.131 
 
4.5.2   The  cancellation  right  in  terms  of  late  delivery  of  the  vessel  
The charterer has the option to cancel a chartering agreement if the contract provides for it. 
If the chartering agreement contains a cancellation clause, the ship-owner’s liability in case 
                                                
 
125 Michelet, “Håndbok i tidsbefraktning”, p. 275 and Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, 
Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, §§ 16.82 and 16.98-16.101. 
126 Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, § 16.82. 
127 Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, 16.77. 
128 The anti-technicality note grants the charterer a period of grace in order to ensure that 
the vessel is not withdrawn on the basis of mere technicalities, see e.g. BIMCO’s explana-
tory note to the NYPE93 Clause 11 and Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., 
“Time Charters”, § 16.127. 
129 Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, § 16.128-16.135. 
130 Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, “Scandinavian maritime law”, p. 31 
131 Steen, Herman, ”Cancellation clauses in voyage charter parties”, p. 137. 
 32 
of its breach of contract in form of late delivery of the vessel at the point in time agreed 
upon between the parties, is strict.132 This means that if the vessel is delivered later than the 
point in time indicated in the chartering agreement, either by a time of delivery or a cancel-
lation time, the charterer is entitled to terminate the contract, regardless of the cause for 
such delay.133 However, the charterer may only claim damages if the breach of contract by 
way of late delivery of the vessel amounts to a repudiatory breach of contract.134 
 
The ship-owner may, however, require the charterer answer to whether or not the charterer 
will accept a later delivery of the vessel. In such case, the ship-owner must provide a new 
time of delivery. If the charterer fails to reply after having received such request from the 
ship-owner, the indicated delivery date in the ship-owner’s notice will be regarded the new 
cancellation time and/or delivery time of the vessel.135 Also, the charterer may only cancel 
the chartering agreement before delivery has actually taken place.136 If the charterer does 
not cancel the chartering the agreement, the ship-owner is still obliged to deliver the vessel 
as the passing of the cancellation time does not affect the parties’ contractual obligations.137 
4.6   Comparison  on  Norwegian  and  English  maritime  law  
In both legal systems, the starting point will be the chartering agreement and the wording 
of the provisions in said agreements.138 The judicial systems will then interpret the clauses 
and the intentions of the contracting parties when they were drafting the clauses in order to 
determinate when and where a cancellation will be rightful.139  
 
                                                
 
132 Østergaard, ”Søretten i formueretligt perspektiv”, p. 231, Bråfelt, Camilla, ”Fleksibilitet 
i certepartiforhold”, p. 125. 
133 Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, § 24.8. 
134 Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, §§ 24.18 and 24.19. 
135 Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, § 7.5 and § 8.35. 
136 Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, § 24.16. 
137 Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, §§ 24.4 and 24.15. 
138 Bråfelt, Camilla, ”Fleksibilitet i certepartiforhold”, p. 201. 
139 Bråfelt, Camilla, ”Fleksibilitet i certepartiforhold”, p. 201-202. 
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In Norway, the Norwegian Maritime Code will apply but as the provisions on e.g. cancella-
tion in case of both hire payments140 and late delivery141 are only declaratory142, the parties’ 
may very well have determined otherwise in the chartering agreement143 and, thus, the 
Norwegian Maritime Code will provide advice when resolving disputes arising out of the 
charterparty. 
 
If the hire payment is delayed, the ship-owner is entitled to withdraw the vessel from the 
services of the charterer. Also, the delay in hire payment entitles the ship-owner to termi-
nate the contract. Further, under Norwegian law the ship-owner is by declaratory law enti-
tled to damages for the loss of bargain and any other losses suffered as a consequence of 
the counterparty’s breach of contract.  
 
Under English law, the charterer will per se be entitled to terminate the chartering agree-
ment once the cancellation time occurs and the vessel has not been delivered to the charter-
er, provided that the charterparty include a provision containing such clause. In other 
words, under English law there is no test applied evaluating whether there was a breach of 
the contractual provisions in terms of the state of the vessel etc.144  
 
The right to receive damages subsequent to a breach of contract by the contractual counter-
part is different from the legal position in Norway and dependant on both the exact wording 
of the contract, factual circumstances, and the background law. The position under English 
law will be examined further below section 5.2. 
  
                                                
 
140 The Norwegian Maritime Code Section 391. 
141 The Norwegian Maritime Code Section 375. 
142 The Norwegian Maritime Code Section 322. 
143 Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, “Scandinavian maritime law”, p. 37. 
144 Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, chapter 24, en con-
trario, and Bråfelt, Camilla, ”Fleksibilitet i certepartiforhold”, p. 198. 
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5   The  recent  development  in  English  law  
5.1   Introduction  -­  English  authorities’  influence  on  Norwegian  law  
Norwegian maritime law is influenced by English maritime law and Norwegian courts will 
find inspiration in English precedents if they feel the circumstances are applicable. One of 
the reasons for this is what has been described as “the Scandinavian lack of authorities.”145 
Another reason could be that the English tradition for a detailed decisions. In Norway deci-
sions are often shorter and the judge’s reasoning shorter, in Denmark the difference is even 
greater where often only the key points and the conclusion is published.146 Therefore, a lot 
more arguments and understandings can be withdrawn from decisions given by English 
judges than Scandinavian. Another – and obvious – reason is that chartering agreements 
throughout the maritime sector, Scandinavia included, often choses English law to govern 
the matter and an English venue for the arbitration proceedings in case of disputes arising 
out of or in connection with the agreement.147 Further, the nature of international chartering 
agreements provides for an international understanding of the contracts concluded, and as 
English law is leading on the matter, English authorities can often not be ignored as the 
overall understanding of the parties intentions upon conclusion of a contract of this charac-
ter will be an international understanding of the standardised contract form used by the 
parties.148 The influence from English background law on Norwegian law and the under-
standing on Norwegian contract clauses is indisputable.149 
 
                                                
 
145 Solvang, Trond: ”Forsinkelse i havn”, p. 56. 
146 Solvang, Trond: ”Forsinkelse i havn”, p. 59. 
147 See in this regard section 3 and Solvang, Trond: ”Forsinkelse i havn”, p. 67-69 and p. 
102-103. 
148 Solvang, Trond: ”Forsinkelse i havn”, p. 71. The Arica case is an example of this, see 
Solvang, Trond: ”Forsinkelse i havn”, p. 73-83. 
149 Bråfelt, Camilla, ”Fleksibilitet i certepartiforhold”, p. 187-188. 
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Therefore, it is important to bear the English approach in mind when drafting and negotiat-
ing chartering agreements also governed by Norwegian law.150 It is however always subject 
to careful consideration both of the subject matter and the legitimacy of the decision given 
and the authority of the court giving the decision, before applying any authority.151 Thus, it 
is a prerequisite for the usage of English authorities in the interpretation and understanding 
of a chartering agreement that there is a solution under English law giving clear guidance 
on the issue in dispute.152 
 
Two recent English court cases are pointing in directions that are not entirely unidirection-
al. In the following, the two cases will be examined and compared in more detail in order to 
provide a deeper perspective on the position under English law when it comes to non-
payment of hire under chartering agreements. 
5.2   Recent  English  case  law  
Under English law the ship-owner will usually have the right to cancel the charterparty 
even if the breach of the obligation to pay hire is trivial.153 Recent English case law has 
however given rise to a discussion on how to classify time stipulations in chartering agree-
ments when it comes to the charterer’s obligation to pay hire.  
 
In 2013, the case between Kuwait Rocks Co. and AMN Bulkcarriers was decided in Eng-
land, leading to an extensive debate. Ship-owners worldwide appreciated the decision stat-
ing that an immense uncertainty as to whether or not the duty to pay timely hire under a 
chartering agreement was a condition had ended. However, in 2015 a similar case between 
Grand China Logistics and Spar Shipping was decided by the same Commercial Court in 
England. And the decision was exactly the opposite. Once again, the debate initiated.  
                                                
 
150 The Swedish scholar Kurt Grönfors is in favour of interpreting Swedish and Scandina-
vian law in the light of English law, which seems to go a bit further than legal theory from 
Norway and Denmark. See Grönfors, Kurt, “Tolkning av fraktavtal”, p. 50-51. 
151 Solvang, Trond: ”Forsinkelse i havn”, p. 113-116. 
152 Bråfelt, Camilla, ”Fleksibilitet i certepartiforhold”, p. 39. 
153 Steen, Herman, ”Cancellation clauses in voyage charter parties”, p. 137. 
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In the following, the two cases will be introduced to bring perspective to the introduction to 
English law on contracts above and to bring up the factual circumstances of the cases as 
they are important to make the underlying premise on whether or not the chartering agree-
ments and the legal status on the hire payment provisions in said agreements tangible.  
 
5.2.1   The  Astra154  
5.2.1.1   The  facts  of  the  case  
The Astra was chartered by Kuwait Rocks Co. under a time charterparty dated 6 October 
2008 based on the NYPE46 standard form for a period of five years from AMN Bulkcarri-
ers Inc.155 The hire was to be paid in cash 30 days in advance.156 If the charterer failed to 
comply with this payment requirement, the ship-owner was entitled to withdraw the vessel 
from the service of the charterer.157 If due payment was not made, the ship-owner should 
provide the charterer with a written notice to comply with the payment requirement and 
allow the charterer an additional two days to rectify the failure to provide due payment.158 
 
After delivery of the vessel, the market rates started falling and the charterer’s sub-charter 
hire was subsequently lower than the contractual hire agreed upon between the ship-owner 
and the charterer. In January 2009 the charterer therefore asked for a re-negotiation of the 
hire originally set to USD 28,600 daily and asked for a reduction by one-third to a daily 
rate of USD 19,600. A few proposals of a lesser deduction followed in the months to come 
before the charterer made a statement letting the ship-owners of the vessel know that the 
                                                
 
154 Kuwait Rocks Co v. AMB Bulkcarriers Inc. [2013] EWHC 865 (Comm). 
155 The Astra, para. 2. 
156 The NYPE46 time clause 5 is referred to and quoted in the Astra, para. 3. 
157 The Astra, para. 3. 
158 The NYPE46 time clause 31 is referred to and quoted in the Astra, para. 3. 
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owners of the charterer would declare the charterers bankrupt if the hire was not low-
ered.159  
 
After the instalment hire due on 1 July 2009 was not paid, a reduced daily hire of USD 
21,500 was agreed upon for the coming 12 months. In this connection, an addendum to the 
charter-party was made. 
 
The re-negotiated hire rate and the conclusion of said addendum did, however, not stop the 
charterer’s requests for further reductions in the daily hire rate or threats of declaring the 
charterer bankrupt if the ship-owners did not comply with the charterer’s wishes. The char-
terer was as such still losing money on a daily basis, as the sub-charter hire was lower than 
the agreed hire between the charterer and the ship-owner.160  
 
Once the addendum was set to expire, in July 2010, the charterer failed to make timely 
payment of the hire. The ship-owner subsequently issued an anti-technicality note161 in 
response to which the charterer asked for an extension of time to make payment. The ship-
owner offered to extend the period with the lowered rate for a further three weeks if the 
charterer then would make full payment. However, the charterer failed to make payment 
and on 4 August 2010, the ship-owner withdrew the vessel from the service of the charter-
er, terminated the charter-party and initiated arbitral proceedings.162 
                                                
 
159 The Astra, para. 4. 
160 The Astra, para. 7-8. 
161 The anti-technicality note grants the charterer a period of grace in order to ensure that 
the vessel is not withdrawn on the basis of mere technicalities, see e.g. BIMCO’s explana-
tory note to the NYPE 93 Clause 11 and Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., 
“Time Charters”, § 16.90-16.91. 
162 The Astra, para. 9-12. 
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5.2.1.2   The  arbitration  award  
The ship-owner claimed compensation for loss of earnings from 4 August 2010 until expiry 
of the time charterparty on 9 November 2013 crediting the hire the ship-owner had been 
able to recover under a substitute charter-party.163 
 
The arbitrators decided that the charterer’s duty to pay hire in clause 5 of the NYPE char-
terparty used by the parties was not a condition for the contract under English law.164 The 
arbitrators did however state that in accordance with clauses 4 and 6 of the NYPE contract, 
the ship-owners were entitled to damages for future loss of earnings if the contract was 
terminated or cancelled as a result of “any breach or failure of the charterers to perform its 
obligations”.165 
 
The arbitrators also decided that the charterer was in repudiatory breach of contract as the 
charterer by their actions had conduct had “evinced an intention no longer to be bound by 
the charterparty”166. Further, the arbitrators acknowledged the ship-owners’ arguments that 
the charterer’s actions by repeatedly threatening to declare bankruptcy amounted to repudi-
atory breach.  
 
The charterer appealed the arbitrators’ award arguing that, firstly, the tribunal had applied 
the wrong test in order to find that they were in repudiatory breach of contract and, second-
ly, that the tribunal had not found that the compensation clauses in the addendums were 
penalty clauses.167 The ship-owner on the other side appealed the decision that the duty to 
pay hire under the charterparty was not a condition. The latter is the important part in this 
regard. 
                                                
 
163 The Astra, para. 13. 
164 The Astra, para. 14. 
165 The Astra, para. 16. 
166 The Astra, para. 17-21. 
167 Clause 4 of Addendum 1 and/or clause 6 in Addendum 2, see the Astra, para. 23.  
 39 
5.2.1.3   The  Commercial  Court’s  decision  
The case was decided by Justice Flaux of the Commercial Court, who decided that the 
wording of clause 5 in the NYPE charterparty “makes it clear that there is a right to with-
draw whenever there is a failure to make punctual payment” and that such right of with-
drawal is per se a right to terminate the contract. Further, it was found that “this (right to 
withdraw) is a strong indication that it was intended that failure to pay hire promptly 
would go to the root of the contract and thus that the provision was a condition.”168 
 
Secondly, Justice Flaux found that where time provisions are used in commercial contracts, 
time is to be considered to be of the essence and, as such, the relevant provision is a condi-
tion under the contract.169  
 
Thirdly, Justice Flaux found that the consideration to the importance of commercial cer-
tainty in commercial transactions results in the necessary outcome that a provision as 
clause 5 in the NYPE contract is a condition of the contract as it would leave the ship-
owners “in a position of uncertainty as to whether to withdraw the vessel or to soldier on 
with a recalcitrant charterer until such time as the owners were in a position to say that the 
charterers were in repudiatory breach”.170 As such, the ship-owner met by a breach of con-
tract would be left with no remedy or alternative to make the most of the situation in the 
current contractual relationship if the market was falling, if the charterer’s actions were not 
repudiatory.171 
 
                                                
 
168 The Astra, para. 109 
169 The Astra, para. 110 
170 The Astra, para. 115. 
171 The Astra, para. 115. 
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5.2.2   The  Spar  Shipping172  
5.2.2.1   The  facts  of  the  case  
Grand China Logistics chartered by way of three charterparties three bulk carriers from the 
registered ship-owner, Spar Shipping. All charterparties were on NYPE 93 forms.173 From 
April 2011, the charterer was in arrears with payments of hire and after having called on 
the guarantees provided by the charterer, the ship-owner withdrew two of the vessels and 
terminated the related charterparties on 30 September 2011.174 The ship-owner then com-
menced arbitral proceedings against the charterer claiming the hire due under the char-
terparties and loss of bargain for the term from the cancellation of the charterparties until 
expiry. Shortly after, and prior to the arbitral hearing, the charterer went into liquidation. 
The ship-owner thus brought the claim against the charterer under the guarantees provid-
ed.175 
 
The ship-owner contended that it was entitled to damages for loss of bargain as the pay-
ment of hire was a condition of the contract, alternatively an innominate term and the lack 
of payment constituted repudiatory breach of contract.176 
5.2.2.2   The  Commercial  Court’s  decision  
The case before the Commercial Court was decided by Justice Popplewell who disagreed 
with Justice Flaux on a number of issues177 and thus concluded that the payment of hire 
was not a condition as “(i)f the owner is not paid fully and on time in advance, effect should 
be given to the right for which he has bargained, in unqualified terms, no longer to provide 
                                                
 
172 Spar Shipping AS v. Grand China Logistics Holding (Group) Co. Ltd. [2015] EWHC 
718 (Comm).  
173 The Spar Shipping, para. 1. 
174 The Spar Shipping, para. 3. 
175 The Spar Shipping, para. 4-5. 
176 The Spar Shipping, para. 8-9. 
177 The Spar Shipping, para. 95. 
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the services of the master and crew to the defaulting charterer, and to be free to employ his 
vessel elsewhere.”.178 
 
In addition, Justice Popplewell did not find that when there is a contractual right to termi-
nate the contract for the breach of a given provision, said provision is automatically a con-
dition of the contract.179 
 
Justice Popplewell also found that in mercantile contracts there is no presumption that indi-
cations of time as e.g. the time payment makes such provisions of the essence absent indi-
cations to the contrary in the given contract.180 
 
Further, Justice Popplewell found that the contract has been negotiated between “hard-
headed and experienced business men”181 and that the parties’ exposure was balanced as 
the charterer in a risen market would bear the risk of having to charter in vessels at a higher 
rates if the contract had been terminated.182  
 
As such, Justice Popplewell, disagrees with Justice Flaux that there is a single and central 
issue of commercial certainty to take into account as Popplewell states that “there is no 
uncertainty over the ability to put an end to future performance.”183 Popplewell elaborates 
explaining that the party not in breach cannot be certain as to when the exact point in time 
is when he is enabled to recover damages for the loss of bargain but that this uncertainty is 
common to all commercial contracts and that “owners of vessels are not unique in the 
commercial world (…)”.184 
                                                
 
178 The Spar Shipping, para. 114. 
179 The Spar Shipping, para. 155. 
180 The Spar Shipping, para. 167. 
181 The Spar Shipping, para. 140 with a quote from Empresa Cubana de Fletes v. Lagonisi 
Shipping Co. Ltd. (The Georgios C) 1971 1 QB 488. 
182 The Spar Shipping, para. 141. 
183 The Spar Shipping, para. 200. 
184 The Spar Shipping, para. 200. 
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Popplewell further reasoned that the standard contracts used in this matter has had the same 
wording as for the payment clauses in 40 years without any of neither the ship-owning enti-
ties nor the chartering companies have felt the need to elaborate on the wording making 
timely payment “of the essence” and as such an obvious condition of the contract.185 
5.2.3   Comparison  
Both decisions contain numerous amount of references to various authorities, precedents, 
legal theory and scholarly writings. One concerns the NYPE46-form (clause 5) and the 
other the NYPE93-form (clause 11) but although the differences in general between the 
two forms are significant, there is no distinction between the two clauses regarding the 
payment of hire.186 
 
The decisions, however, are distinct on a number of issues, of which the following four are 
the most interesting:  
 
(i)   the right to withdraw the vessel is an indication that the payment of hire ought 
to be considered a condition of the contract; 
(ii)   there is a general principle in mercantile contracts that time is of the essence 
and, therefore, that timely hire payment was a condition of the contract; 
(iii)   the anti-technicality clause in the chartering agreement is an indication that 
timely hire payment was a condition of the contract; and 
(iv)   the need for commercial certainty between the contracting parties provided for 
the timely hire payment to be considered a condition of the contract. 
 
Justice Flaux reviewed in detail the various previous cases which have touched upon the 
question of whether a failure to pay hire amounts to a breach of condition as opposed to a 
                                                
 
185 The Spar Shipping, para. 201 and para. 205. 
186 See BIMCO’s explanatory note to the NYPE93 Clause 11. 
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breach of an innominate term. Justice Flaux reached the conclusion that payment of hire 
was a condition of the contract and that the failure to make due payment of hire, therefore, 
entitled the ship-owners to withdraw the vessel from the service of the charterers and claim 
damages for the loss of profit for the remaining charter period. 
 
Justice Popplewell reached the opposite conclusion after an equally detailed analysis of the 
authorities and precedents and following a careful analysis of the each of the arguments 
and legal principles mentioned in The Astra.  
5.2.3.1   The  right  to  withdraw  the  vessel  is  an  indication  that  the  payment  of  hire  ought  to  
be  considered  a  condition  of  the  contract  
Justice Popplewell disagreed with Justice Flaux that the right to terminate the chartering 
agreement with reference to the failure to provide punctual payment meant that non-
payment was sufficiently serious to justify cancellation and therefore that the failure to pay 
due hire was intended to be a condition under the contract by the contracting parties. 
 
Justice Flaux’s primary reasoning for his conclusions was that the right to withdraw the 
vessel was "a strong indication that it was intended that failure to pay hire promptly would 
go to the root of the contract and thus that the provision was a condition."187 Justice Pop-
plewell on the other hand is of the opinion that the right to withdraw the vessel is necessary 
due to the fact that the parties did in fact not meant for the hire payment to be a condition 
of the contract. Popplewell states in this regards that the “existence of a termination provi-
sion tells one nothing about the status of the term without discovering the intention of the 
parties as to the consequences of the contractual right of termination by this process of 
interpretation."188  
 
                                                
 
187 The Astra, para. 109. 
188 The Spar Shipping, para. 155. 
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The withdrawal clause in the Spar Shipping case provided, thus, only for the ship-owner to 
withdraw the vessel from the service of the charterers in case of non-payment of hire, and 
the chartering agreement did not make payment of hire a condition as the wording of the 
provision did not contain the necessary express wording to have that effect. 
 
5.2.3.2   There  is  a  general  principle  in  mercantile  contracts  that  time  is  of  the  essence  
and,  therefore,  that  timely  hire  payment  was  a  condition  of  the  contract  
Secondly, Justice Flaux reasoned that there is a general rule within commercial, mercantile 
contracts that time is of the essence, even without express stating it so, when the provision 
provides for something to happen at a certain point in time. Therfore, the obligation to pay 
hire a condition of the contract.189  
 
Justice Popplewell disagreed and with reference to a substantial number of precedents and 
legal theory decided that under English law, time of payment is not of the essence in mer-
cantile contracts without expressly agreed so and stipulated in the contract.190 Therefore 
Justice Popplewell found that the contracting parties could not have had the intention that 
any breach, no matter how serious or minor, of the hire payment obligation should have the 
consequence to allow the ship-owners to terminate a long-term charterparty even for a triv-
ial breach of contract. 
 
5.2.3.3   The  anti-­technicality  clause  in  the  chartering  agreement  is  an  indication  that  
timely  hire  payment  was  a  condition  of  the  contract  
Justice Flaux then argued that the even though the contract contained an anti-technicality 
clause, payment of hire could be seen as a condition of said contract – and that the mere 
                                                
 
189 The Astra, para. 110. 
190 The Spar Shipping, para. 203. 
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existence of this clause, on the contrary, evidenced the importance of payment of the hire in 
due time.191 
 
Justice Popplewell on the other hand stated that the existence of such a clause was not in 
favour of the argument that payment should be considered a condition.192 Put simply, Jus-
tice Popplewell considered the history and development of anti-technicality clauses and 
stated that such clauses cannot influence whether or not payment is a condition but merely 
regulates the circumstances under which the ship-owner’s can withdraw the vessel in case 
of default. 
 
5.2.3.4   The  need  for  commercial  certainty  between  the  contracting  parties  provided  for  
the  timely  hire  payment  to  be  considered  a  condition  of  the  contract  
Fourtly, the issue of commercial certainty divides the two judges. Justice Flaux was of the 
opinion that if the the ship-owners were left in commercial uncertainty if the ship-owners 
were merely entitled to withdraw the vessel and not entitled to receiving damages for loss 
of bargain in case of non-payment as the ship-owners then, in a falling market, would have 
to chose between two evils; (i) to withdraw the vessel and contract with a different charter-
er – if at all possible -, or (ii) carry on business with a charterer reluctant or unwilling to 
pay the hire agreed upon in the chartering agreement.193 Justice Popplewell responded that 
there existed no uncertainty as the party not in breach had the contractual possibility to 
terminate and withdraw the vessel in case of breach, whilst the certainty to rightfully claim 
damages was a different issue.194  
 
Justice Flaux also emphasised that receiving hire is the single most important part of any 
chartering agreement for the ship-owner. A breach of contract which has the effect of mak-
                                                
 
191 The Astra, para. 111. 
192 The Spar Shipping, para. 182. 
193 The Astra, para. 115. 
194 The Spar Shipping, para. 205. 
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ing the ship-owner put out money to cover the performance of the charterer’s orders is to 
be considered so serious as to amount to a breach of a condition of contract, 195 as the ship-
owner then would act as the charterer’s bank or credit facility. 
 
Justice Popplewell is opposing to this argumentation, stating that chartering agreements 
often covers a charter period of multiple years and that claiming damages for the remaining 
period of the chartering agreement would not be proportionate.196 And that such result 
could not have been regarded to be the joint intentions of the contracting parties. Justice 
Popplewell did not refer to them but it seems that the background for his findings may be 
that a ship-owner in case of the party’s breach of contract is not left entirely without reme-
dies. The ship-owner has a lien on sub-freights; he can intercept the bill of lading freight; or 
suspend the services of the vessel.197 
5.3   Sub-­conclusion  
Justice Popplewell found himself unable to follow the decision of Justice Flaux in The As-
tra and concluded that payment of hire by the charterers was not a condition of the contract. 
And after reviewing basic English theory on the matter, it may not come as a surprise that 
the decision in The Astra was not followed. The previous six editions of the leading text-
book on time charterparties198 all advise that payment of hire is not a condition of the con-
tract. The latest, 7th edition from 2014 proposes to await a new decision as the Astra is con-
sidered controversial.199 Justice Popplewell’s lengthy analysis on English law and many 
                                                
 
195 The Astra, para. 42. 
196 The Spar Shipping, para. 198-205. 
197 If under a NYPE-form. Both the Astra and the Spar Shipping was on NYPE46-forms. 
See section 3.1 for the examination of the NYPE93. Both editions contain similar provi-
sions; in NYPE in Clause 18, in NYPE93 in Clause 23. 
198 Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”. 
199 Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, § 16.128 
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references to authorities and precedents was foreseen by at least a few English solicitors 
and, as well, subject to a lengthy criticism at this institute.200  
The decision is as such likely to restore the previously accepted view that the obligation to 
pay hire under a time charter is not a condition if not the contracting parties explicitly 
agrees to it. If a ship-owner wants to recover damages for loss of bargain following a can-
cellation, the ship-owner must seek to bring the charterparty to an end for repudiatory 
breach of contract and, in doing so, demonstrate that charterers' default is sufficiently seri-
ous as to deprive the ship-owners of substantially the whole benefit of the charterer. Alter-
natively, the ship-owner must make it clear from the wording that payment of hire is indeed 
a condition of the contract.  
 
6   Discussion  
6.1   Which  of  the  English  precedents  should  be  followed?  
The two decisions were given by the same Commercial Court and none of them were ap-
pealed. Therefore, some uncertainty as to the legal character and the remedies given the 
party not in breach in case of non-payment of hire remains. In the following, I will discuss 
my view on which of the decisions should be followed in the future.  
 
As we have seen, leading scholars since 1973201 agreed that the obligation to pay hire under 
time charterparties is not a condition. A recent master thesis with this institute concluded the 
same and was recently published in the MarIus publications, which continuously publish the 
leading scholarly writings of both students and professors and professionals within the mari-
time field in Scandinavia. However, since there now seems to exist two schools, one must 
                                                
 
200 Jolanta Zabityte: “The Obligation to Pay Hire in Time-Charterparties”, Oslo, 1 Novem-
ber 2014. 
201 The decision given in the Brimnes, (1972) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 465, See Coghlin, Baker, 
Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”, § 16.129. 
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decide which is the right to follow. Or most right. In the following, the thesis will discuss 
which of decisions given should be followed in the future.  
 
Justice Popplewell decided in the Spar Shipping case that the obligation to pay hire is not a 
condition under the charterparty, reasoning that ship-owners should not be treated in any other 
way than parties to other commercial contracts. 
 
Having the utmost respect for the legal reasoning in both the decisions, the discussion will 
not include general aspects of English law but merely focus on the discussion between the 
two judges on commercial certainty. 
 
Justice Popplewell suggested that since nothing in the charterparty explicitly stated that hire 
payment was a condition, there was no reason to consider whether this was the case, nor for 
arbitrators or judges to interpret the contract in such manner. One could however suggest oth-
erwise, bearing in mind the reasoning behind Justice Flaux’s argument on “commercial cer-
tainty” and the factual circumstances behind the dispute. 
 
Commercial certainty as a concept relates to the foreseeability and reasonableness from a 
commercial point of view of the outcome of a legal dispute. As we have seen, the NYPE 
standard chartering agreement gives the ship-owner the right to withdraw the vessel from ser-
vice of the charterer if the hire is not received as provided for in the contract. If subject to Eng-
lish law, any delay in payment is sufficient for the ship-owner to rightfully withdraw the ves-
sel. As we have also seen, the hire is to be paid in advance in order to finance the expenses of 
the ship-owner and to provide security for charterer’s obligations. 
 
In a static market, these considerations would be the only ones to consider. However, the mar-
ket is not static. 
 
In a rising market, the pressure will be on the charterer to continuously perform timely in or-
der to keep the contract which is now a bargain for the charterer. If the charterer fails to per-
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form and make due payments, the ship-owner will undisputedly be entitled to terminate the 
contract. Thus, the charterer will make timely, prompt and regular payments as the sanction 
otherwise likely to be imposed by the ship-owner will deprive the charterer of a substantial 
benefit. In a falling market, the tables have turned.  
 
If one is to follow the decision of Justice Popplewell, the ship-owner only has the possibility 
to terminate the contract and let the vessel to other parties in the market. As the market is fall-
ing, the ship-owner will be deprived of the benefit of the initial contract as damages are only 
collectable if the breach is deemed repudiatory. The charterer can thus breach the obligation to 
make timely payments only to put even more pressure on his contractual counterparty. The 
party not in breach is thus the one under pressure, as the ship-owner is likely to await future 
payments instead of terminating the contract as the monetary outcome might be even worse if 
terminating than for example re-negotiating.  
 
In any contract, incentives and possible sanctions are the driving factor for the parties. “What 
is in for me?” seems to be common logic for every business man. And if we exclude the inclu-
sion of softer motives like the consideration to one’s brand and general reputation in a market 
as a reliable business partner, the monetary incentives and possible sanctions are often the 
most efficient. In a falling market, the charterer would not be met with any sanctions if the 
only sanction available for the ship-owner was to withdraw the vessel. The charterer would be 
rewarded for the breach of his or her contractual obligations.  
 
In my opinion, Justice Popplewell failed to look at the charterparty through the eyes of the 
parties concluding the contract but merely focused on the strictly legal history of shipping 
under English law. Justice Popplewell suggested as such that there is “nothing in the owners’ 
interest which is not adequately protected by an option to cancel”.202 This is true in a static 
market or a market on the rise, but far from the truth in falling market. Justice Popplewell 
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acknowledges this uncertainty but states that the risks of the market are even for both contrac-
tual parties as no-one can foresee how the market may or may not develop.203  
I see a few problems with this way of seeing things.  
 
One, the ship-owner is – if payment of hire is not considered a condition – only entitled to 
damages is the breach is repudiatory. If not, the ship-owner will receive no damages as for the 
loss of bargain. If the obligation to pay hire is considered an obligation, the ship-owner will 
receive what he or she was entitled to under the contract as had it been fulfilled, and the con-
tracting parties will as such be in the same position as they would have been in in either case.  
 
Two, there is a substantial lack of commercial balance between the parties if the decision giv-
en by Justice Popplewell is to be followed. As such, one of the contracting parties – the char-
terer – will be handed the upper-hand in terms of re-negotiating the terms of the contract if the 
market is falling. The charterer is risking nothing but to have the vessel withdrawn with what-
ever inconveniences following from having to charter a substitute vessel etc. The ship-owner 
on the other hand will meet imminent economic consequences as the market is now a different 
one.  
 
Legal theory and tradition should not be in the way of the commercially balanced result. If the 
decision given in the Spar Shipping case is to be followed, a severe enough sanction for the 
charterer to ensure timely payment does not exist. Thus, the decision in the Astra is in my per-
spective to be preferred. 
 
                                                
 
203 The Spar Shipping, para. 141. 
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6.2   The  cancellation  and  suspension  clauses  in  the  standard  chartering  
agreements  
6.2.1   The  provisions  in  the  standard  chartering  agreements    
6.2.1.1   Non-­payment  of  hire  
All of the standard chartering agreements contain provisions stating that the hire must be 
paid in advance. Further, they all contain provisions giving the ship-owner the right to can-
cel the chartering agreement is hire is not paid after a notice and the expiry of an additional 
period of time for the charterer to make payment.  
 
As such, the provisions aim to ensure foreseeability and commercial certainty by fixing the 
consequences for the innocent party facing a breach of contract by its counterpart.  
 
The cancellation clauses incorporated in the chartering agreements thus make it easier to 
foresee when the party not in breach can rightfully cancel a chartering agreement without 
risking unlawful cancellation of the contract, making itself liable for breach of contract?204 
However, the chartering agreements fail to provide provisions as to when damages are pay-
able and as such they do not contain the remedies if the charterparty is breached. This mat-
ter is governed by the choice of jurisdiction of the contracting parties. As such, the cancel-
lation clauses do not by themselves provide neither foreseeability nor commercial certainty. 
 
Thereby, the chartering agreements does not contain provisions that explicitly ensure such 
commercial certainty. All of the agreements introduced rather provides provisions giving 
the contractual parties a series of rights when the contractual counterpart is in breach. Thus, 
the commercial certainty must be ensured when applying the background law and interpret-
ing the contractual provisions. As such, the standard chartering agreements are subject to 
the same criticism as mentioned above. Only if the decision given in the Astra is followed, 
                                                
 
204 Steen, Herman, ”Cancellation clauses in voyage charter parties”, p. 118. 
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the agreements ensures commercial certainty. If not, the wording of the provisions should 
be revised if the industry indeed wishes to have commercial certainty when entering into 
chartering agreements. 
6.2.1.2   The  cancellation  clauses  when  the  vessel  is  delayed  
The standard chartering agreements also contain provisions giving the charterer the right to 
cancel the contract if the ship-owner is in breach of contract by not providing the charterer 
with the vessel at the agreed time. As such, the provisions determine specifically when the 
ship-owner is in breach and when the charterer may terminate the contract because of this 
breach. In other words, the evaluation of the breach is straight forward. But does it ensure 
foreseeability and creates commercial certainty amongst the contracting parties? 
 
If we use the same examples as above, with market fluctuations, the ship-owner will in a 
fallen market of course be interested in making timely delivery as he or she otherwise will 
be met with a cancellation and will have to charter off the vessel again at a lower rate. On 
the other hand, in a market on the rise, the ship-owner does not have the incentive to make 
delivery within the cancellation time as there is no remedy in the contract for late delivery.  
 
The same is true if the example is twisted and voyage charterparties are used as an exam-
ple. If the ship-owner fails to provide the vessel timely but the port of delivery is located in 
a geographically distant part of the world, where the vessel would have to cross waters with 
little or no regular traffic, the charterer will have little incentive to cancel the contract. 
Thus, the ship-owner is in a strong commercial bargaining position.205 However, is the case 
the opposite, meaning that the cargo is positioned in an area where traffic is regular and 
easily accessible, the charterer will on the other hand have the upper hand in re-negotiating 
with the imminent threat for the ship-owner to be faced with a rightful cancellation of con-
tract as a result of delay where the chartering agreement contains a cancellation clause. 
 
                                                
 
205 Steen, Herman, ”Cancellation clauses in voyage charter parties”, p. 119 and p. 160. 
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As such, Justice Popplewell has a valid point when suggesting that the risks of the contracts 
are balanced. They may well be foreseeable but they are not commercially certain as the 
lack of fixed a monetary sanction does not cause the parties to fulfil their contractual obli-
gations.  
6.3   Commercial  certainty  under  Norwegian  law  
6.3.1   Hire  payment  
The Norwegian Maritime Code provides clear bases for suspension and cancellation when 
met by a breach of contract by a contractual counterpart. Hire is to be paid in advance and, 
if not, the innocent party may withhold performance of his or her contractual obligations 
awaiting contractual performance by the party in breach. When the breach of contract is 
substantial, the contract may be cancelled and the innocent party is entitled to damages. 
The threshold for when the breach is deemed to be substantial is either agreed upon by the 
parties to the contract, or determined by the background law. As we have seen, the parties 
are free to agree to lower the threshold for when a breach may be seen as substantial. If not, 
the background law provides advise on the matter. 
 
Whilst Norwegian contract law is somewhat fiduciary on when a breach of contract is sub-
stantial and leaves substantial room for errors or faulty conclusions when evaluating 
whether or not a breach is substantial, the Norwegian Maritime Code offers firm advice on 
the matter.  
 
In general contract law the definition of a substantial breach is vague:  
 
“the characteristic for the termination because of a breach of contract is not only 
that the (innocent) party has been deprived of the benefit of the contract but that the 
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deprivation is so material that it would not be reasonable to uphold the contract it-
self.” 206 
 
However, the Norwegian Maritime Code is specific. If the charterer does not pay the hire 
timely, the vessel may be withdrawn, the charterparty terminated and damages are payable. 
And if the ship-owner fails to deliver the vessel timely, the charterer may cancel the char-
terparty and claim damages.  
 
6.3.2   Delay  in  delivery  
When it comes to the delay in the delivery of the vessel from ship-owner to the charterer, 
the Norwegian Maritime Code is clear as well. If the vessel is delayed, the charterer may 
cancel the charterparty and the ship-owner is liable to pay damages to the charterer for the 
losses suffered as a consequence of the delay. The cause of the delay is immaterial.  
 
6.3.3   Sub-­conclusion  
When putting the looking at findings above and comparing them other standardised com-
mercial contracts used in Norway, the picture is the same. In shipbuilding, the contracting 
builder continues to hold the title to the vessel until delivery207, and that the right for the 
buyer of the vessel to claim delivery of the vessel is interdependent on the full payment of 
the purchase price. 
 
In construction contracts, the principle is the same. If the buyer is in breach of contract, the 
buyer is liable to pay the contracting builder damages for the loss of bargain and the costs 
                                                
 
206 Krüger: “Kontraktsrett,” p. 759. My translation. The original quote is:”det karakteristi-
ske for misligholdshevning er dermed ikke bare at parten er unddratt det kontrakten for-
speiler ham, men at avviket dessuten er såvidt kvalifisert at det ikke anses som rimelig at 
kontrakten skal stå ved lag.”  
207 Meland, Øystein, “Skipsbygging – Kommentarer til Norsk Standard Skipsbyggingskon-
trakt”, p. 26 and p. 65. 
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related to cancellation of the contract.208 In a recent case, the building contractor was 
awarded a compensation of a total of 15 % of the total contract value.209 Furthermore, both 
in onshore construction210 and in the offshore construction211, the contracting builder is met 
with daily penalties if the works either does not progress according to plan or if delivery is 
delayed.212 
 
The Norwegian Maritime Code and the Norwegian, and Scandinavian legislation as such, 
have incorporated and implemented the commercial factors so that the legal result is both le-
gally and commercially foreseeable and commercially sane. A result as the one reached by 
Justice Popplewell seems not just unlikely but unthinkable. 
 
7   Conclusion  
Concluding the process of examining four of the most commonly used chartering agree-
ments in the industry, two decisions given by the Commercial Court in England and the 
legal literature and articles relating to the subject, the biggest mystery seems to be what the 
fuss in the industry was all about. Six former issues of the leading legal theory on char-
terparties213 governed by English law all agree that payment of hire is not a condition. Four 
of the most commonly used charterparties all have English law as the default choice, and 
                                                
 
208 NS8405 clause 39(5), Marthinussen, Giverholt, Arvesen, “NS8405 med kommentarer”, 
p. 675-677, and Bredholt, Martens, Mathiasen, Philip, “Søloven med kommentarer” p. 675. 
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210 Marthinussen, Giverholt, Arvesen, “NS8405 med kommentarer”, chapter 34. 
211 Off shore construction contracts – or more commonly “petroleumskontrakter” in Nor-
wegian – are covered by two standard contracts; the Norsk Fabrikasjonskontrakt or the 
Norsk Totalkontrakt referred to as NF07 and NTK07.  
212 On offshore construction, see NF07 Article 24(2), Kaasen, Knut, “Petroleumskon-
trakter”, p. 614-622. On onshore construction, see NS8405 Section 34(2), Marthinussen, 
Giverholt, Arvesen, “NS8405 med kommentarer”, chapter 34, and Hagstrøm, Bruserud, 
“Entrepriserett”, p. 350-355. 
213 Coghlin, Baker, Kenny, Kimball, Belknap, Jr., “Time Charters”. 
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that parties to the contracts should thus all be well aware of the possible outcome if being 
met by one of the breaches of contract topics of this thesis.  
 
The second-largest mystery must be why English law – up until the decision given in the 
Astra and after the Spar Shipping – did not weigh commercial certainty higher. Maybe be-
cause the contracting parties are well aware of the legal position and that the charterparties 
as such ensures foreseeability. The parties are and were free to agree on a different out-
come in advance by drafting the contracts differently. As such, one could argue that if the 
parties are all well aware of the possible outcome that too is commercial certainty. To me, 
Justice Flaux managed to balance the commercial certain result with the commercially sane 
result.  
 
However, Justice Popplewell’s point that the risks are balanced is to some extent true. As 
we have seen, the situations in delays of hire payment and the delays in delivery of the ves-
sel under the same chartering agreements are highly comparable. As such, there is an over-
all balance, but the balance in the contractual relationship if you look at the contractual provi-
sions isolated is non-existing. Delivery of the vessel happens once in a time charterparty, 
whilst hire payments are a regularly recurring occurrence and the financial risks are significant 
for the ship-owner. Even from an overall perspective, the contractual balance merely exists 
until the market moves. Once the market moves, an upper hand is given one of the contractual 
parties. History tells us that most commercial markets are not static. The shipping trade is no 
different. 
 
Specifically regarding the hire payments, the balance in the chartering agreements is disturbed 
when the charterer by not paying the hire can provoke a situation where the ship-owner is 
forced to re-negotiate the terms of the chartering agreement. The charterer does not risk any-
thing but having the vessel withdrawn from its services and if the market rates are lower than 
at the time the contract was agreed, the charterer as such has nothing to lose but everything to 
win from such a manoeuvre.  
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Ship-owners often contract for the construction of vessels when having already agreed the 
terms of a time chartering agreement or at least having a charterer ready to time charter the 
vessel once constructed. Also, the vessels are often constructed as per the instructions of the 
charterer so that the vessel meets the specific requirements of the charterer.  
 
The risks of being a ship-owner are therefore substantially increased if the decision in the 
Spar Shipping is to be followed, as the ship-owner takes all risks related to the develop-
ment in the market once the chartering agreement is running. Obviously, depending of 
when the hire under the chartering agreements is fixed, the risk of market fluctuations prior 
to delivery of the vessel may be born by the time charterer. As pointed out above, that risk 
however is only relevant up until delivery whilst the risks of the chip-owner continues to 
run throughout the duration of the time charterparty. 
 
Therefore, and with reference to the arguments and reasons, I have suggested above, the 
decision in the Astra is in my opinion to be favoured. The charterer has one fundamental 
obligation under a time charterparty: to pay the hire. At the same time, the ship-owner’s 
primary obligation is to provide the charterer with a vessel at the agreed point in time.  
 
The preparatory works to the Norwegian Maritime Code stipulates the ambition for the 
statute to make its mark on the understanding of international chartering agreements even 
where Norwegian law is not directly applicable.214 To me it seems obvious and indeed ad-
visable that when it comes to the suspension and cancellation clauses and the right to dam-
ages when being met by a breach of contract of such fundamental character, the world 
should look to Norway. 
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